Research

1.Effect of job reservation on career choices, (with Shubhashis Gangopadhyay). We investigate the impact of job reservations for disadvantaged sections of the population on group incomes in a model where people have to undergo training in order to apply for a job in the formal sector. Training costs are higher for the disadvantaged group than for the general group so the former will undergo training only if the probability of getting a formal sector job is very high. Introduction of job reservations for the disadvantaged fails to increase group income for the disadvantaged when number of jobs is low. Increased group incomes for them are accompanied by losses from applicants who apply for he formal sector job and fail to get through. Only when the number of jobs is very high, does reservation amount to a transfer of income from the general to the disadvantaged group.
2. Limits to Citizens? Demand in a Democracy, (with Raghbendra Jha). We examine the amount that citizens can legitimately demand from the government in a majoritarian democracy. Asking very low amounts, lets the government corner much of the tax revenues, asking very high an amount makes the government ignore the citizen and favour others who have asked for less.
3. When are boycotts effective? I am looking into calls of boycotts of elections and boycott calls given against certain communities in the even of a riot or religious conflict and trying to analyze whether it will be successful or not. I am trying to develop a general theory of boycotts, outlining when they are going to be successful and when they will be not.